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30 May 1964

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*South Vietnam: [Political and religious uneasiness continue to create difficulties for the Khanh government.]

[There are indications that some determination of the fate of the four arrested generals of the former Minh junta may be imminent. Khanh has stated that their trials would take place soon after Buddhist celebrations on 26 May. According to Khanh, evidence during the trials would implicate General Minh in plotting with the French, thus forcing his replacement as titular chief of state. Minh's departure could arouse new dissatisfactions among military officers.]

[Despite the relative calm of last week's Buddhist ceremonies, militant Buddhists in the north reportedly are still criticizing Khanh for retaining in local posts former Diem officials, who they claim are continuing to oppress Buddhists. At the same time, Catholic leaders, who have been restraining their followers, have now authorized them to defend their political and religious rights with any appropriate means of expression.]

[These political and religious problems may be having an effect on the government's prosecution of the counterinsurgency effort, which is showing little progress. Khanh complained last week that a slackening in the army command required more of his attention and that he needed someone to relieve him from time-consuming internal conflicts.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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
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*Congo: The Congo National Army (ANC) seems to be deteriorating rapidly.

An "elite" paracommando company rushed to Kivu Province to bolster frightened government forces in the area turned and fled at the approach of an insignificant number of rebels. Other insurgents apparently have overcome an ANC garrison in Fizi, on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Contrary to some press reports, it is doubtful that any of these rebels have received substantial aid or direction from the radical Congolese exile "Committee of National Liberation."

The erosion of the ANC and the impending departure of UN troops scheduled to be completed by 30 June, appear to be convincing other Congolese dissidents that they can rebel with impunity. Several anti-government disturbances have been reported in various localities throughout the Congo. Other outbreaks can be expected.

Meanwhile, former Katangan leader Tshombe, still in self-imposed exile in Spain, is awaiting the appropriate opportunity to return. Last Monday, he told the US ambassador in Madrid that he did not intend to stay in Spain "indefinitely."

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NOTES

*India: Leaders of the dominant faction of India's ruling Congress Party continue to maneuver for the election of Lal Bahadur Shastri, a moderate, to the Prime Ministership. Although the Shastri forces probably control a majority of the necessary parliamentary votes, they are seeking additional support to make the transition as smooth and as nearly unanimous as possible. President Radhakrishnan, as well as the pro-Shastri forces, continue to favor the early appointment of a permanent government/

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Belgium-MLF: Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak told US Ambassador MacArthur on 27 May that he is increasingly convinced that the multilateral nuclear force may be the most important single step that can be taken at this juncture to save NATO. In his judgment, NATO must take some major positive action, and the MLF is the only such project on the horizon. Spaak pointed out, however, that Belgian parliamentary and public opinion is still hostile to the MLF, and that he does not think this can be reversed until after the Belgian elections, which must be held by next spring.

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Bolivia: Elaborate security measures are being taken to prevent any attempt by opposition forces to instigate disorders during tomorrow's national elections. Armed civilian militia units reportedly have been deployed throughout La Paz in anticipation that opposition leaders, frustrated in their attempts to force postponement of the elections, may turn to armed insurrection to prevent President Paz Estens-
soro's re-election. Militia units loyal to Paz have also been sent to the Department of Santa Cruz, where opposition feeling is running high, and Paz' bodyguard has been augmented.

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✓ British Guiana: British officials in London indicate that the declaration of the state of emergency in British Guiana will not of itself delay the elections planned there for late this year, but that continued violence in the colony could do so. The governor has already had to obtain more troops. Local security officials feel that their powers are inadequate, but London is prepared to strengthen them if necessary. London believes that Jagan would use violence to prevent or delay the elections, but that he fears his inability to maintain order will have adverse repercussions.

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